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Abstract—Protecting source code against reverse engineering
and theft is an important problem. The goal is to carry out
computations using confidential algorithms on an untrusted party
while ensuring confidentiality of algorithms. This problem has
been addressed for Boolean circuits known as ‘circuit privacy’.
Circuits corresponding to real-world programs are impractical.
Well-known obfuscation techniques are highly practicable, but
provide only limited security, e.g., no piracy protection. In this
work, we modify source code yielding programs with adjustable
performance and security guarantees ranging from indistin-
guishability obfuscators to (non-secure) ordinary obfuscation.
The idea is to artificially generate ‘misleading’ statements. Their
results are combined with the outcome of a confidential statement
using encrypted selector variables. Thus, an attacker must ‘guess’
the encrypted selector variables to disguise the confidential
source code. We evaluated our method using more than ten
programmers as well as pattern mining across open source code
repositories to gain insights of (micro-)coding patterns that are
relevant for generating misleading statements. The evaluation
reveals that our approach is effective in that it successfully
preserves source code confidentiality.
I. INTRODUCTION
Intellectual property, e.g., in the form of algorithms, is
costly to develop and it is always at risk of being stolen.
In particular, in an untrusted cloud environment, algorithms
holding valuable expert knowledge are susceptible to theft: If
the cloud infrastructure is compromised, an attacker can steal
(compiled) program code. Insider attacks are also a real threat.
A typical approach to (partially) protect intellectual property
is to obscure it in such a way that it becomes difficult to figure
out its purpose and functionality. However, such obfuscation
does not solve the problem satisfactorily as the functioning
of the algorithm can still be observed and analyzed, even to
the point where the whole algorithm and its parameters are
reconstructed. Thus, an attacker with access to the cloud can
still steal an algorithm and execute it without modification. In
turn, Boolean circuits can be cryptographically protected, e.g.,
using fully homomorphic encryption. An attacker obtaining a
‘protected’ circuit cannot evaluate it. However, computations
on Boolean circuits alone are considered highly impractical
due to the large size of circuits that are needed for complex
functionality. We tackle the problem at a higher level by
encrypting statements in source code instead of individual
gates. Our primary focus is on encryption of source code as
written by the programmer (or intermediate code). Our obfus-
cation technique yields analogous guarantees as for Boolean
circuits, i.e., candidate indistinguishability obfuscators, using
higher level source code primitives. Moreover, we discuss
how to obtain less secure obfuscations that run much faster.
Obfuscation is done by a novel technique: we transform source
code into “encrypted” source code by adding a multitude
of additional misleading statements (and variables) combined
with selector variables. Selector variables are encrypted binary
variables that “choose” the right result among misleading
and confidential statements. Since the selector variables are
encrypted, it is generally non-trivial to determine which state-
ments merely serve the purpose of misleading an attacker and
which statements actually contribute to the computation of
the result. In particular, current de-obfuscation methods and
tools are unable to do so. The difficulty of de-obfuscation
or extracting the confidential source code depends on the
background knowledge of the attacker about the program
to de-obfuscate as well as on the choice of the misleading
statements. We also provide an analysis of several open source
code programs to determine patterns that might have to be
observed when creating obfuscated source code. Finally, we
give a brief assessment of our method using a small-scale
experiment using actual programmers whose task was to break
a simple encrypted piece of code. Programmers were very far
from breaking our obfuscation scheme despite the fact that we
used a rather limited degree of source code encryption. Thus,
the results provide some evidence that the proposed method
is indeed effective.
II. MODEL AND PROBLEM
A client wishes to execute confidential source code in
an untrusted environment. The data might or might not be
confidential, but we assume that the source code computes on
encrypted data. Typically, the clients encrypt code (and data)
and send both to an untrusted server. The server performs
possibly multiple computations using the encrypted code and
various input data. It returns encrypted results to clients, where
the result are decrypted.
Intuitively, the mechanism is secure if the adversary having
full access to the server (including CPU registers, memory,
hard drives and the obfuscated code) does not learn anything
about the source code or about the data. However, in practice,
it might be sufficient if only certain parts or aspects of a
piece of software remain confidential, eg. the call graph or the
architecture. We focus on the case where an attacker should
learn as little as possible how the computation of the output
works.
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2We assume that all encryptions are perfectly secure, i.e., an
attacker cannot gain any knowledge from encrypted data.
Obfuscation maps a confidential program PC from a
program class CC to another program from a program class
CO, ie. we can express an obfuscator O as O : CC → CO.
As we shall discuss later, the relationship is non-injective,
ie. every program PO ∈ CO maps to some set CC . Whereas
operations in the given program PC operate on plaintexts,
obfuscated programs in CO perform computations on
encrypted data. For example, a program a · b with plaintext
variables a, b might correspond to ENC(a) · ENC(b)
on encrypted values, ie. ENC(a), ENC(b) denotes
ciphertexts and the ‘·’ operator performs multiplication
of plaintexts using encrypted values only, such that
DEC(ENC(a) · ENC(b)) = a · b, where DEC denotes
decryption. For this example, knowing ENC(a) · ENC(b)
suffices to discover the program on plaintexts, ie. a · b,
since the performed operations on plaintext can generally be
inferred by the attacker having the obfuscated program with
operations on ciphertexts. For example, for the Goldwasser-
Micali crytposystem multiplication of ciphertexts corresponds
to an XOR of plaintexts. We assume that the attacker
knows which cryptoysystem is employed. For more general
computations we need either fully homomorphic encryption or
secure multi-party computation. Generally, merely encrypting
data used for computation does not provide any security of
algorithms.
The adversary might know the obfuscation algorithm and
program classes CO and CC . The task of the attacker is
to assign to each program P from the program class CC a
probability p(P ) stating his belief that the program P is the (or
a) confidential program PC . Thus, the goal of the attacker is to
choose P to maximize p(P ) without knowing the distribution
p. However, an attacker might have some knowledge about the
distribution. In particular, he might know coding patterns, eg.
covering a few lines of code, that are more likely to occur
than other lines of code. Generally, finding a program P ′
that differs only slightly from the confidential program PC
might also be satisfactory. An attacker is said to successfully
break our scheme, if it can do so using any computation taking
polynomial time in the size of the largest program in CO.
A. Indistinguishability Obfuscation
Indistinguishability obfuscation (see Definition 1 in [13])
essentially says that the obfuscations of two circuits look
‘equivalent’ to an attacker. This definition focusing on circuits
can be extended to more general programs being composed of
more complex commands than Boolean gates. By contrast, we
also use additional misleading input data for a program that
has no impact on the result, eg. a function f(x) = x2 can be
extended to f(x, y) = x2+0·y. Therefore, we assume that any
program can be called with any superset of the required input
to compute the result. A program class CC is an arbitrary set
of programs. We discuss program classes and their relation
to our obfuscation technique later (see Section III-C). More
formally, we define similarly to Definition 1 in [13]:
Definition 1 (Indistinguishability Obfuscator (iO) ). A uniform
Probabilistic Polynomial-Time (PPT) machine iO: CC → CO
is called an indistinguishability obfuscator for program class
CC if the following is satisfied:
i) For all P ∈ CC and inputs x, we have
Pr[DEC(P ′(ENC(x))) = P (x) : P ′ ← iO(P )] = 1
ii) For any PPT distinguisher D, there exists a negligible value
 such that for all pairs of programs P, P ′ ∈ CC if P (x) =
P ′(x) for all inputs x, then
|Pr[D(iO(P )) = 1]− Pr[D(iO(P ′)) = 1]| ≤ 
Condition (i) essentially demands that the obfuscated pro-
gram and the non-obfuscated program produce the same out-
come. Condition (ii) says that knowing an obfuscated program
is of no use to an attacker. This definition by itself is not suf-
ficient to ensure confidentiality without using proper program
classes. In other words, an obfuscator satisfying the above
definition does not necessarily protect an algorithm well. In
particular, the confidential program is not protected sufficiently
if the program class is not meaningful in that many programs
in the program class can easily be ruled out as the confidential
program (see Section III-C). Furthermore, Condition (ii) in the
above definition (and also in [13]) focuses only on avoiding
the leakage of programs that behave identically with respect
to outputs, ie. P (x) = P ′(x). In practice, any program with
very similar input-output behavior to the confidential program
might also be deemed confidential.
B. Program Definition
We keep to a simple yet sufficient definition. Assume
that a program P of length n is a sequence of statements
s0, s1, s2, ..., sn−1. A statement si is an assignment of a
(simple) expression to a variable, ie. a statement s could
be r := a · b with expression a · b and result variable
r. A simple expression consists of a single operation
and two (input) variables. We generally write it in the
form Op(Input1, Input2), eg. MUL(a, b) denotes the
multiplication a · b. The program returns the result, ie.
variable, of the last statement. Later (see Definition 2),
we introduce in more detail combining statements, which
aggregate the results of several misleading statements and
one confidential statement. Note that this simple definition
of a statement also covers control-flow statements for
code operating on encrypted data (only), since conditional
statements must be transformed to hide the outcome of the
branching conditions. For example, loop unrolling is done
using an upper bound on the possible number of iterations.
For illustration, consider a program to square a number
a. Let program P (a) consist of a single statement b :=
MUL(a, a) with input value a ∈ {0, 1, ...10}. Assume the
set of possible operations in the used programming language
is given by SO := {MUL,ADD,DIV } and there is just
one variable a. A simple expression consists of an operation
and its input variables, eg., MUL(a, a). If we define the set
3of programs to be all programs with one simple expression
and one input variable, we could define the program class
as P = {(b := MUL(a, a)), (b := ADD(a, a)), (b :=
DIV (a, a))}. If we use two statements, where the first defines
some variable, we get P = {(b := MUL(a, a); c :=
MUL(a, b)), (b :=MUL(a, a); c := ADD(a, b)), ...}. Out of
these programs three actually perform the desired functionality
of squaring a number, namely (b := MUL(a, a); c :=
MUL(a, a)), (b := ADD(a, a); c := MUL(a, a)), (b :=
DIV (a, a); c := MUL(a, a)). The number of simple ex-
pressions given |V | variables and |SO| operations taking t
input variables can be bounded by |SO| · |V |t. Any of the
prior programs that squares a number might serve as an
obfuscated program in the traditional sense (i.e., without using
encryption). But standard dead code elimination would already
remove the added misleading statement for obfuscation. Next,
we introduce a more sophisticated technique that makes use
of encrypted selector variables.
III. SOURCE CODE OBFUSCATION THROUGH ENCRYPTION
We distinguish two levels of source code encryption differ-
ing in the unit of abstraction they seek to conceal: Program
level encryption considers programs as a whole. A finer
granularity is given by hiding individual statements.
A. Program Level
The idea is to conceal the confidential program is to run
(all) possible programs (not just those yielding the desired
output), ie. all programs from class CC . Then we select the
confidential result out of all results using encrypted binary
selector variables. Since all programs are run and only the
result is selected, an attacker obtains no information which
of the executed programs yields the result. Thus, the class
CO consists of just one program executing all programs in
CC using encrypted inputs. It is important that the order of
computation of the programs is randomized, ie. we randomly
permute all programs and then evaluate them.
Let ENC(ri) be the encrypted result of program Pi(x) ∈ CO
for an input x. Define bi ∈ {0, 1} to be a selector bit for
program i, ie. bi = 1 if i = i∗ and 0 otherwise. Let Pi∗ = PC
be the confidential program, e.g., with the functionality to
square a number. We say Pi∗(x) = r∗ yields the desired
result r∗. The final encrypted result r∗ can be obtained by
ENC(r∗) :=
∑
iENC(bi)·ENC(ri), where ‘·’ is a multipli-
cation on encrypted data and the summation is also performed
on encrypted values. The client can decrypt ENC(r∗) to
get r∗. For example, say P0 = PC := {MUL(a, a)}
and P1 := {}ADD(a, a)}. We set b0 = 1 and b1 = 0.
Therefore, ENC(r∗) := ENC(MUL(a, a)) · ENC(b0) +
ENC(ADD(a, a)) · ENC(b1) = ENC(MUL(a, a))
Since the bits bi as well as the results are encrypted, an
attacker does not know which of the results is chosen. It is
immediate that such an obfuscator satisfies Definition 1 given
that all secure computation mechanisms are secure, ie. we
fulfill condition (i) due to the definition of selector variables
resulting in choosing the output of the confidential program for
any input among all executed programs. We fulfill (ii), since
there is essentially just one obfuscated program (comprising
of all programs), ie. any two programs P ′ and P map to the
same obfuscated program.
Running entire programs and selecting the result is not ideal.
When choosing k programs with similar running times or
computational costs, the running time increases by a factor of
k. But an attacker only has to choose one out of k programs,
i.e., the attacker breaks the “encryption” with probability 1/k
by guessing. We would like to have at least an exponential
relationship in the computational cost and the difficulty to
guess, e.g., 1/2k. The key idea to reach this goal is to apply
selector bits per statement rather than picking entire programs.
B. Statement Level
An attacker should not be able to infer a specific statement,
even given that he knows all prior and all following statements.
Our strategy is analogous as for (entire) programs: In order to
disguise the statement s we create a set of k− 1 ‘misleading’
statements Mi. Then all statements {M0, ...,Mk−1, s} are
randomly permuted. After that they are executed in that order.
We choose the correct result, ie. that of the confidential
variable s, using binary selector variables bi. More precisely,
we compute the combining statement, which is defined as
follows:
Definition 2. The combining statement for a set of statements
S = {SC ,M0, ...,Mk−1} with confidential statement SC and
misleading statements Mi is given by
ENC(r∗) :=
∑
s∈S
ENC(bs) · ENC(rs)
where rs is the result of statement s and bs are binary
(selector) variables, such that bs = 1 for s = SC and 0
otherwise.
For example, for the statement c := MUL(a, a), we
could choose a misleading statement ADD(a, a) and use the
combining statement c′ :=MUL(a, a) · b0 + ADD(a, a) · b1
with binary selector variable b0 = 1 − b1 being 1 and
b1 being 0. Note, that since b0 = 1 and b1 = 0 we
have c = c′. If the selector variables b0, b1 as well as
other variables and subexpressions are encrypted, i.e., we
compute ENC(c′) := ENC(MUL(a, a)) · ENC(b0) +
ENC(ADD(a, a)) · ENC(b1) (with ·,+ operating on en-
crypted data), then an attacker is not able to discover the true
statement without knowing b0 (or b1).
In contrast to program level security (Section III-A), we
just execute a single but larger program. Generally, for the
same level of security, this single program is much more
compact (and efficient to evaluate) than the concatenation of
all programs used for program security. Roughly speaking, for
programs of length n, where each statement could be assigned
one out of k expressions, the number of feasible programs is
kn. The concatenation of all misleading statements is of length
k · n, since for each of the n statements there are k options.
This concatenation covers all kn feasible programs. Therefore,
by executing k ·n rather than n statements, an attacker has to
choose from kn options. This polynomial relationship between
4computational costs and number of possible programs is much
better than the linear relationship presented in the prior Section
III-A. Therefore, we focus on statement level security.
So far, we have focused on obfuscating a single confidential
statement by combining its result and the result of several
misleading statements. In principle, one could also generate
“misleading combining statements” consisting of misleading
statements only, ie. the entire statement is irrelevant. Thus,
these combining statements merely serve the purpose of
confusing the attacker (and hiding the true length of the
confidential program). In fact, such ‘misleading combining
statements” might make comprehension more difficult. But
they do not make the life of the attacker harder, when it comes
to obtaining a program with the same input-output behavior.
The attacker does not have to guess any misleading statement
correctly, since all of them have no impact on the output.
Still, the number of possible expressions k can be ex-
ceedingly large, rendering the execution of k · n statements
practically infeasible. Therefore, we can only choose a subset
of all possible statements as discussed next.
C. Program Classes
There is an interesting relationship between an obfuscated
program PO and program classes CC containing the confi-
dential program PC . An obfuscated program PO using binary
selector variables defines a program class CC , i.e., a set of
programs, containing the confidential program that could have
been mapped by the obfuscator to create PO.
For example, the confidential program PC = {r :=
MUL(a, a)} could have been mapped to the encrypted pro-
gram PO := {r0 := MUL(ENC(a), ENC(a))); r1 :=
ADD(ENC(a), ENC(a)); r2 := r0 · ENC(b0) + r1 ·
ENC(b1)}, where MUL,ADD compute the multiplication
and addition of plaintexts using encrypted values. The en-
crypted program P) defines the program class CC consisting of
{MUL(a, a), ADD(a, a)}. The program class defined by the
encrypted program depends on the details of the obfuscation
algorithm, its parameters and the input program. Intuitively,
large program class CC seem preferable, since they enlarge
the search space for the attacker. Indistinguishability obfusca-
tion ensures that an attacker seeing the obfuscated program
cannot determine any information about which program of all
programs in the program class CC is the confidential program.
But indistinguishability obfuscation alone does not necessarily
give any practical security guarantees, if the program class CC
is known to the attacker and there exist many programs that are
close to the confidential program. For example, if all programs
in the program class CC (including the confidential program)
yield (almost) the same output on any input then an attacker
can pick any program from the class to get (almost) the same
functionality. Moreover, it might be possible to exclude many
programs from the program class CC through simple reasoning
that might not even require background knowledge. Certain
programs might be executable and yield valid outputs, but their
semantics might seem unreasonable. For example, a program
that returns the same output irrespective of the input. An
attacker can safely ignore such programs therefore reducing
the size of the program class containing the confidential
algorithm. It is generally not clear how to best choose the
program class so that the attacker cannot easily eliminate many
programs from the class with more or less simple analysis or
background knowledge. There are many factors that come into
play. We discuss mechanisms to create obfuscated programs
in the next section.
IV. OBFUSCATION METRICS
Our metrics primarily follow (but enhance) the metrics for
(standard) obfuscation [10]. We introduce a new metric that
characterizes the quality of a program class.
Code potency: Obfuscated code can be assessed using tradi-
tional code complexity measures, e.g., based on control flow
and data access. One might also use parameters from the
obfuscation process itself, which illustrate the complexity of
the encrypted code. For example, if we choose (up to) k
misleading statements for each statement, we might use a
metric such as a “mislead factor”. This is analogous to the
security parameter for encryption.
Resilience: This is the ability to withstand attacks using
automated tools (maybe given some background knowledge).
For example, an attacker could try to reconstruct the program
using known-plaintext attacks, i.e., he knows the input of
the function and a few outputs. The attacker could then
simply try each program from the encryption space and return
all matching ones. Another example involves knowledge of
coding guidelines used in the program or having unencrypted
code of the same programmer at hand. Programmers typically
have their own style that might be comparable to a signature
identifying the programmer. Thus, an attacker could search
for patterns in the encrypted code that match the coding
guidelines (or the patterns matching the programmer’s coding
style). This could help to reduce the search space of possible
non-obfuscated programs given an obfuscated program. Two
metrics have been proposed in the literature [10]: i) program-
mer effort to construct an automatic de-obfuscator; ii) de-
obfuscator effort: execution time and space required by the
de-obfuscator.
One might also consider a metric for measuring potency reduc-
tion, stating how effective a de-obfuscator is. For example, for
statement level security it could measure the “mislead factor
reduction”, i.e., the (average) number of misleading (or junk)
statements that the de-obfuscator could identify per statement
that has been obfuscated.
Program class quality: On a high level a program class
should contain programs that are sufficiently different from
the confidential program, such that knowing an obfuscated
programs is of no value to an attacker. Given a program from
the program class, an attacker should not easily be able to
judge whether or not it is the confidential program. Since
our obfuscated program using encrypted selector variables
discloses the program class, both aspects are important. Giving
a formal definition of a program class is difficult, since it
depends on the semantics of a program. However, we might
reason about the attackers capabilities and define the quality of
the program class in terms of the probability estimates p(P )
5of a rational attacker that a specific program is confidential.
A rational attacker would leverage all its knowledge about
the confidential program, the obfuscation algorithm etc. to
compute a probability distribution p(P ) stating the probability
estimate that a program P is confidential. To determine the
quality of the program class given the distribution of an
attacker we define the rank r of a program P as the number
of programs P ′ with p(P ′) ≤ p(PC). We define the quality
of program class CC with a subset S ⊆ CC of programs
such that all of the programs in S are considered confidential
as Q(CC) := 1 − 1/r with r being the minimum rank of
any program P ∈ S. The quality ranges between 0 and 1.
It is 0 if the attacker correctly assigns a (or the) confidential
program the largest probability to be confidential. It is 1 if the
attacker believes it is the least likely. The motivation is that a
very reasonable behavior for an attacker given the probability
distribution p(P ) is to perform an in depth investigation
of the programs sorted by their probability estimate. For
example, assuming the attacker has access to some plaintexts
(input and output), he might check one program after the
other, whether its input-output behavior matches the known
plaintexts. Thus, the time needed to infer the confidential
program depends directly on our quality measure. Defining
the set of confidential programs S is application dependent.
For example, given one confidential program PC one might
define the set S as all programs having the same input-output
behavior for all inputs, ie. S = {P |∀x : P (x) = PC(x)}.
Stealth refers to difficulty to de-obfuscate programs by hu-
mans, meaning that junk statements should not be easily
discoverable by a human. The ability to discover them sig-
nificantly depends on the knowledge a human has about the
program (and surrounding statements).
Execution cost: For instance, the overhead factor being the
ratio of the (average) execution time of non-obfuscated and
the obfuscated program.
V. PRACTICAL OBFUSCATION ON THE STATEMENT LEVEL
Executing all possible (simple) expressions for a real-world
programming language instead of just a single one for each
statement in a program is infeasible for even moderately
large programs. Thus, we introduce a weaker form of security
by adding fewer misleading statements in order to improve
performance. Choosing these misleading statements in a way
that is hard to disguise is non-trivial. One might have to take
into account existing patterns in code. and, potentially, remove
these coding patterns to create a more uniformly looking
encrypted code that is less sensitive to statistical attacks
(Section V-A). We aim at schemes that make it possible to
strike a balance between several metrics, in particular security
and performance. We discuss metrics for obfuscation and
security (Section IV) as well as what kind of information of
a real-world program might be worth to hide (Section ??).
A. Preprocessing - Source Code Uniformization
Before obfuscating source code, we might modify the code
through several preprocessing operations that do not change
the semantics of the code but make it more ‘uniform’ in the
sense that patterns consisting of potentially multiple statements
are removed. We might also avoid generating highly unlikely
patterns. Source code might contain patterns due to preferences
of a programmer or due to the nature of the problem. Program-
mer preferences might be found in certain command constructs
used to solve frequently reoccurring tasks. Patterns can be
mined and used for statistical attacks. Assume the obfuscated
statement contains two types of comparison expressions a 6= b
and a = b out of which one is misleading. Assume we
know that a programmer frequently almost never uses ‘ 6=′
but almost uses ‘not’ ‘ 6′ and ‘ =′ to express inequality, et.
6 (a 6= b). This information makes it easier to find non-
obfuscated code. In another example, a programmer might
also prefer to state a loop condition involving integer I and
loop variable x as x ≤ I − 1 rather than x < I . The
former condition x ≤ I−1 is expressed using two statements,
J := I − 1 and x ≤ J . Therefore, when trying to determine a
statement out of a set of misleading statements, and seeing a
condition x ≤ J , an attacker might investigate the preceding
statements to check whether one of them contains a statement
of the form J := I − 1, if so, this is an indication that
the code contains x ≤ I − 1. Both cases are easy to detect
automatically in source code of typed languages. We can
enforce using, eg. ’·2’ and x < I by rewriting the code
without changing the semantics. In fact, some cases might even
be covered by compiler optimizations. This might reduce the
possibilities for an attacker to exploit prior knowledge about
certain programming preferences.
B. Misleading Code Generation
An essential question for obfuscation relates to the choice
of misleading statements to satisfy the metrics in Section IV.
Several considerations apply:
Number of misleading statements: Choosing relatively few
(misleading) statements might cause only little overhead due
to obfuscation but put security at jeopardy.
Execution costs of a misleading statement: It may be
preferable to choose misleading statements that do not require
a lot of computation. For example, rather than executing a
‘sort’ command on a list as misleading statement, one might
remove the first element. The first command requires O(l log l)
time for a list of length l, whereas the amortized time for the
second command is only O(log l) [23].
Similarity of misleading and confidential statements: One
strategy is to choose misleading statements independently of
existing source code. However, independently chosen state-
ments might be easy to identify, since they might appear
as outliers. For example, given a complex function of many
simpler mathematical functions, such as sine, square root,
division and so forth, it is not recommended to add misleading
statements manipulating strings. It seems likely that a string
expression is identified as not being part of the confidential
program. To make the junk statements hard to identify, poten-
tially given some knowledge about the application or source
code structure, it seems favorable to choose misleading code
that is similar to the actual source code.
Intermediate code vs. source code: One might add statements
6for intermediate code (e.g., Java bytecode) or plain source
code. Generally, in our scenario only intermediate code is
given to an untrusted party. An attacker typically decompiles
it. Modifying intermediate code might cause decompilers to
fail. Therefore, an attacker might have to work on intermediate
code itself, which is considerably harder. Compilers can also
generate intermediate code according to different metrics, for
example with the goal to minimize the amount of code. In our
case, in order to minimize the absolute performance impact of
obfuscation, it seems preferable to generate short programs.
As an example, if we add three junk statements per statement
in a short program, the absolute increase in running time is
less than if we do the same for a long program. Furthermore,
intermediate code might remove certain coding patterns that
could help in statistical attacks (see Section V-A). Thus, if our
obfuscation technique does not account for dependencies, an
attacker might be able to rule out some misleading statements.
In intermediate code, such patterns might be removed.
Simplifying complex expressions: One has to decide which
constructs in the source code should be enhanced by mislead-
ing ‘statements’. Depending on the programming language,
statements are allowed to vary a lot in complexity: they could
be decomposable into many simple expressions. Disguising
a complex statement as a whole, also requires a statement
of similar complexity (otherwise an attacker might assume
that very complex statements are non-junk). Trying to create
complex misleading statements seems rather challenging, since
a single subexpression that appears as outlier might be suffi-
cient for an attacker to disguise the entire complex statement
as ‘misleading’. Furthermore, in the most extreme case an
entire program is expressed in one statement, which results
in similar disadvantages as discussed when obfuscating entire
programs compared to individual statements (Section III-A).
Therefore, it might be preferable to create a uniform source
code representation of simple statements, such as three-address
codes and obfuscate them.
Syntactic and semantic correctness: For three-address code,
a junk statement comprises of an operation and two operands.
Clearly, the operation must be executable for the operands.
This implies that the operands must have a type that is
supported by the operation. But the values of the operands
should also be supported. For example, when adding a division
as a junk statement, the divisor should not be zero.
Operation and operands obfuscation: We can create mis-
leading statements by using the same operations but different
operands or different operations with the same operands or we
can vary both, e.g., for the statement a·b, we could add a+b or
a−b to disguise the operation only and x ·y or e ·f to disguise
the operands only. In order to combine both, we might create
temporary variables involving several variables with selector
variables and then we could use these temporary variables in
various operations. This yields the largest search space for an
attacker. For example, we can set temporary variable t1 to be
t1 := b1 · a + (1 − b1) · x and t2 := b2 · b + (1 − b2) · y for
selector variables b1, b2. We can use these temporary variables
in statements t1 · t2 and t1 + t2. This yields a total of eight
possibilities of statements. More generally, if both temporary
variables can be chosen out of k variables and the operations
can be chosen out of o operations, we get k2 · o possibilities.
Patterns and statement dependency: Statements are gener-
ally not independent. Given a single statement the probability
of the next statement is not uniform across all statements. Parts
of the dependency are due to the data type, that is, only certain
statements are feasible for certain types. For example, given
we know a statement performs string concatenation, it seems
more likely that among the next statements there is another
statement for string operation rather than a trigonometric
function. There might be common patterns consisting of a
sequence of a few statements that are more likely than others
in general or depending on a specific application domain
or programmer. Finding the optimal strategy of the attacker
and the obfuscator to use (or counteract) the knowledge of
pattern could be cast as the problem of finding a mixed-
strategy Nash equilibria, eg. we look at the obfuscator and
the attacker as players. A formal treatment of Nash equilibria
is beyond the scope of this work and we refer to text books
on game theory covering these concepts, eg. [8]. To get some
intuition, consider the following scenario. There are n different
statements S that are not uniformly distributed. There is one
frequent statement F ∈ S with (large) likelihood pl and
every other of the n − 1 statements has the same probability
1/(n − 1), ie. we have pl  1/n. Assume the strategy
of the obfuscator is to generate one misleading statement
for each statement sC belonging to the confidential code
C by choosing it uniformly at random from S \ sC , ie. it
does not choose the misleading statement to be the same as
the confidential statement, since this provides no protection.
Say an attacker wants to choose the correct statement for a
pair of two statements sC ,M with M being the misleading
statement and sC a statement of the confidential program. He
would behave as follows to maximize the expected number
of correctly inferred statements: If one of the two statements
sC ,M equals F , he guesses F . If both statements do not
equal F he chooses randomly among the two. Let us compute
the probability that an attacker correctly infers a statement
given two statements sC ,M of a large program. The attacker is
always correct if the true statement sC is F , which happens for
a fraction pl of all statements. If the true statement is not F but
the misleading statement is F the attacker will always predict
wrongly. If the misleading statement is not F and the true
statement is not F , it predicts correctly with probability 1/2.
Thus, the expected number of correctly predicted statements is
pl+(1−pl) · (1−1/n) ·1/2. Now, assume that our obfuscator
is aware of the true distribution of statements as well. Assume
that it always chooses F as misleading statement if sC 6= F .
If the attacker does not alter its strategy, the expected number
of correctly guessed statements is now only pl. However, we
could do better using a different strategy.
VI. EMPIRICAL EVALUATION
In Section V-B we introduced several general aspects for
misleading code generation. In this section, we discuss some
points in more detail and further provide a short evaluation
by programmers. A key aspect is the structure of the code:
How much dependency is there across statements? Does
7code contain patterns that must be taken into account when
generating code? The second question is discussed next.
A. Patterns in Source Code
Patterns in source code might facilitate the decoding of
obfuscated code using encryption as discussed in the beginning
of Section V. There is a sheer endless number of patterns one
could look for, ranging from high-level design patterns to the
use of individual operators. Since we operate primarily on
a statement level, we compared the frequencies of patterns
on a lower level. We looked at the distribution of operators,
i.e., we counted how often an operator appeared in the code,
since simple statements essentially consist of an operator
and one or two variables. An even more particular statement
involves an integer constant and an operator. We conjectured
that the usage of integer constants might vary significantly
across programmers, for example the usage of ≤ n − 1 vs.
< n. Therefore, we looked at how integer constants are used
within binary expressions, specifically what values they have
and with what operator they are used with. In order to get
some intuition about more complex patterns, we looked at the
composition of binary and unary expressions: What are the
type of expression(s) and the operation that constitute a binary
(or unary) expression?
For comparison, we chose five data mining frameworks
implemented in JAVA namely WEKA, ELKI, JSAT, Java-
ML and Spmf1. We compared all clustering algorithms
per framework together (see Table I) as well as particular
algorithms, namely k-Means and OPTICS clustering (for
k-Means see Tables III), to get a more robust estimate. We
also compared the GUI parts of the frameworks (see Table
II) to detect variation across different applications.
The less uniform code is across programmers and appli-
cation domains, the more important it is to take particular
coding patterns into account. When looking at the standard
deviation and the mean for an application domain on its own
(Tables II and III) for all the structural patterns, we see that
the mean is considerably larger than the standard deviation.
This shows limited dispersion and a certain uniformity. There-
fore, knowing that code stems from a particular framework
helps in predicting a statement but only to a rather limited
degree. Generating misleading statements according to such a
distribution seems helpful, i.e., we might choose misleading
statements such that the overall distribution roughly stays the
same. When comparing the means for the same patterns of
different application domains, we see stronger variation. For
example, the mean for the increment ‘posIncrement NameE’
for GUI and clustering varies by a factor of two. Still, the
differences are not that large that a decoding of statements
would be easily possible by merely knowing that we consider a
specific type of application. Judging from the usage of integer
constants and operators, there are strong deviations for a few
cases. For example, the plus operator occurs almost three
1See http://www.cs.waikato.ac.nz/ml/weka/; http://elki.dbs.ifi.lmu.de/;
https://github.com/EdwardRaff/JSAT and for GUI .../JSATFX; seehttp:
//java-ml.sourceforge.net/; http://www.philippe-fournier-viger.com/spmf/
times more often in WEKA than in JSAT or JavaML. JSAT
does not use integer constants except divisions by 2, ELKI
in turn never uses divisions by 2. This hints at programmer
preferences. Given the strong variation for some examples,
it seems advisable to create misleading commands based on
patterns observed in the code.
Frameworks Mean Std
Pattern Weka Elki JSAT Spmf JavaML
Structural Pattern: Binary and Unary Expression
posIncrement NameE 9 (446) 7 (316) 13 (369) 10 (37) 17 (285) 11.1 3.4
BinaryE plus StringLiteralE 8 (387) 3 (152) 0 (13) 4 (15) 0 (7) 3.2 2.8
assign NameE 7 (342) 10 (441) 10 (285) 9 (32) 10 (165) 8.9 1.1
assign MethodCallE 7 (339) 9 (410) 7 (191) 8 (31) 6 (94) 7.2 1.2
NameE less NameE 4 (195) 5 (251) 6 (172) 2 (7) 4 (62) 4.1 1.5
assign ObjectCreationE 3 (171) 1 (44) 1 (34) 3 (13) 2 (35) 2.2 1.1
Integer Constants in Binary Expression
plus 1 22 (114) 19 (78) 22 (61) 3 (1) 17 (31) 16.6 6.8
minus 1 17 (90) 23 (95) 21 (57) 31 (9) 40 (72) 26.3 8.4
greater 0 16 (86) 11 (45) 9 (25) 7 (2) 9 (16) 10.3 3.2
equals 0 12 (63) 12 (50) 5 (13) 17 (5) 5 (9) 10.1 4.8
notEquals 0 10 (50) 1 (3) 0 (0) 7 (2) 2 (4) 3.8 3.7
divide 2 4 (21) 0 (0) 7 (19) 0 (0) 11 (20) 4.4 4.3
Operators
assign 32 (1360) 28 (1106) 31 (719) 31 (100) 32 (437) 30.6 1.7
plus 29 (1210) 19 (748) 12 (284) 19 (61) 11 (145) 17.7 6.3
less 11 (479) 12 (478) 20 (458) 11 (36) 21 (289) 14.9 4.4
minus 6 (242) 6 (260) 6 (142) 7 (24) 10 (130) 7.0 1.4
equals 5 (228) 6 (242) 7 (155) 12 (39) 3 (45) 6.6 2.9
greater 4 (166) 4 (178) 3 (72) 2 (7) 4 (54) 3.5 0.8
TABLE I
SORTED PATTERNS FOR ALL CLUSTERING ALGORITHMS WITH
RELATIVE(%) AND ABSOLUTE FREQUENCIES IN BRACKETS
Frameworks Mean Std
Pattern Weka Elki JSAT Spmf
Structural Pattern: Binary and Unary Expression
assign MethodCallE 7 (1871) 5 (31) 2 (2) 6 (39) 5.0 2.0
assign ObjectCreationE 6 (1501) 11 (69) 8 (9) 11 (73) 9.0 2.2
assign NameE 6 (1423) 7 (43) 5 (6) 6 (37) 5.8 0.5
NameE notEquals NullLiteralE 5 (1183) 7 (47) 3 (3) 1 (9) 4.0 2.2
BinaryE plus StringLiteralE 4 (1084) 0 (0) 0 (0) 3 (19) 1.8 1.8
posIncrement NameE 4 (1048) 1 (4) 13 (14) 4 (23) 5.2 4.5
Integer Constants in Binary Expression
greater 0 19 (570) 40 (25) 0 (0) 1 (1) 15.1 16.3
minus 1 13 (401) 6 (4) 0 (0) 13 (9) 8.1 5.4
plus 1 11 (344) 8 (5) 0 (0) 1 (1) 5.2 4.7
equals 0 11 (340) 11 (7) 0 (0) 12 (8) 8.5 4.9
divide 2 9 (267) 0 (0) 61 (11) 0 (0) 17.5 25.5
greaterEquals 0 5 (163) 5 (3) 0 (0) 1 (1) 2.9 2.2
Operators
assign 37 (8687) 40 (240) 18 (17) 28 (167) 30.8 8.8
plus 22 (5032) 11 (63) 17 (16) 14 (85) 15.8 4.0
equals 8 (1884) 12 (73) 1 (1) 15 (89) 9.0 5.2
notEquals 7 (1736) 11 (66) 3 (3) 5 (29) 6.6 3.0
less 5 (1228) 2 (14) 17 (16) 3 (20) 7.0 5.9
minus 5 (1140) 3 (15) 14 (13) 2 (15) 5.9 4.7
TABLE II
SORTED PATTERNS FOR GUI WITH RELATIVE(%) AND ABSOLUTE
FREQUENCIES IN BRACKETS
B. (De-)Obfuscation Case Study
In this section we present examples of how simple obfus-
cated code might look like and we also perform a small-scale
empirical evaluation with respect to the ability of humans
to break the obfuscation, ie. the discover the confidential
program. To the best of our knowledge, we are among the
first to do such an empirical study providing some evidence
on the value of obfuscation. We (manually) obfuscated code
8Frameworks Mean Std
Pattern Weka Elki JSAT Spmf JavaML
Structural Pattern: Binary and Unary Expression
assign MethodCallE 12 (65) 10 (7) 7 (6) 11 (7) 0 (0) 8.1 4.3
posIncrement NameE 8 (46) 13 (9) 8 (7) 8 (5) 20 (13) 11.6 4.7
assign NameE 6 (33) 13 (9) 16 (13) 11 (7) 14 (9) 12.0 3.3
BinaryE plus StringLiteralE 5 (27) 0 (0) 0 (0) 3 (2) 0 (0) 1.6 2.1
less MethodCallE NameE 4 (23) 3 (2) 0 (0) 2 (1) 5 (3) 2.6 1.7
plus IntegerLiteralE NameE 4 (22) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0.8 1.6
Integer Constants in Binary Expression
plus 1 40 (29) 13 (1) 25 (2) 0 (0) 0 (0) 15.4 15.3
greater 0 18 (13) 13 (1) 0 (0) 0 (0) 33 (1) 12.7 12.4
equals 0 7 (5) 25 (2) 0 (0) 0 (0) 67 (2) 19.7 25.2
minus 1 7 (5) 0 (0) 25 (2) 20 (1) 0 (0) 10.4 10.3
plus 2 5 (4) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 1.1 2.2
notEquals 0 4 (3) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0.8 1.6
Operators
assign 36 (175) 29 (16) 44 (32) 36 (20) 44 (21) 37.9 5.7
plus 28 (136) 15 (8) 7 (5) 15 (8) 6 (3) 14.0 7.9
less 11 (52) 20 (11) 15 (11) 13 (7) 27 (13) 17.1 5.8
minus 7 (35) 0 (0) 14 (10) 5 (3) 4 (2) 6.1 4.5
greater 5 (22) 2 (1) 3 (2) 4 (2) 4 (2) 3.3 1.0
equals 4 (19) 9 (5) 4 (3) 13 (7) 4 (2) 6.8 3.5
TABLE III
SORTED PATTERNS FOR K-MEANS ALGORITHM WITH RELATIVE(%) AND
ABSOLUTE FREQUENCIES IN BRACKETS
for two simple tasks that are understandable by any novice
programmer. The first task is to avoid division by zero by
checking the value of a divisor and return some (error) value,
if the divisor is zero:
if (y!= 0) then r:=x/y else r:=-9999
The second task is to return the maximum of an array:
m:=a[0]
for(x=0;x<y;x=x+1)
if m >= a[x] then m:=a[x]
We assumed that all constants are encrypted and appear as
variables. The code of task one becomes:
if (y!= u) then r:=x/y else r:=v
Obfuscation: There are many different options to obfuscate
the code using encryption (see Section IV). Discussing
multiple techniques in detail is out of scope for this work.
Therefore, we focus on a case study with simple manual code
generation. We considered two levels of obfuscation (L0 and
L1) with a different number of misleading statements and
variables.
For the lower-level obfuscation, i.e., L0, we introduced
two fake variables w, z. Thus, for obfuscation we allow
any operand for the first task to be one of the variables
u, v, w, x, y, z. For comparison operations, we allowed
either a ‘non-equal’ or a ‘smaller than’ comparison. For
mathematical operations, we used multiplication or division.
We did not introduce any additional fake statements. Thus,
for the L0 obfuscation, since variables occur at 5 places, this
gives 55 options for choosing variables and 22 for choosing
operations. Overall, this gives a total of 12,500 options.
For the first simple assessment by humans, we limited
the number of source code options, i.e., the program class
CC , and rather presented complete code examples. More
specifically, we chose 10 options for each task yielding 10
code examples chosen from CC . They were selected such
that an ordinary software engineer could solve them without
additional knowledge in a short amount of time. For example,
we had an option containing a statement ’r:=z/z’ that was
easy to identify as most likely not being coded by a human.
We figured that letting a programmer deal with encrypted
code with binary selector variables is too complex.
For the more thorough obfuscation (L1) we used three mis-
leading combining statements and five simple statements per
combining statement, ie. for each statement in the confidential
code we added four more statemetns. We used 8 instead of 6
variables and additionally +,− operators. In contrast to L0,
where we only listed 10 options per task, we allowed for 5
options per 6 statements, yielding a total of 56 = 15, 625
options for the participants to choose from. The handouts to
programmers are listed in Figure 1.
Fig. 1. Handouts to programmers for Simple Obfuscation L1
Experimental Setup: We gave the programmers a short intro-
duction (≈ 15 minutes) about the obfuscation technique in
general including examples. The programmers were not told
what problem the source code solves, only that it is a common
and simple task. We conducted two separate experiments one
for L0 and for L1 obfuscation with different programmers.
Experiment 1: For L0 we used a total of 6 programmers.
They were given a paper sheet with the source code options.
They had 20 minutes to break the code. The participants had
to rate how much sense an option makes to be the piece
of code solving the problem. The answers had 5 options
expressing different degree of confidence. The perfect answer
would consist of one ‘Yes, that’s it’ and nine answers ‘No, it’s
not’. Since all options are syntactically correct, programmers
needed some kind of understanding of the semantics of the
program. Even given very good understanding, they might not
be able to get the perfect answer since they lack background
information about the task. Rating the source code options cor-
responds to the process of de-obfuscation, since programmers
choose a probability distribution over all available options for
confidential programs.
Experiment 2: For L1 we used 5 programmers (different from
the first experiment). We only considered the first task dealing
with division by zero. The handout to programmers is given
in Figure 1. In this case, it seems very difficult to identify the
9task. Therefore, we asked them to state unlikely and likely
combinations of options for each statement. Put differently,
rather than specifying for each statement just a single option
they could rate several options as likely (or unlikely). Thus,
they could state sets of options using multiple choices per
statement. This corresponds to fixing paths (or traces) in the
code (see the example shown in Figure 1). They were also
given 20 minutes to solve the task.
Results: Experiment 1: Overall programmers solved this task
well, ie. they managed to de-obfuscate the code. Given the
limited set of options this is not surprising. Four participants
were indeed able to identify the correct option for the first
task. The others ranked it as likely but together with at least
one other option. On average, programmers were only able to
reliably exclude two options. For the second task, there were
two equally valid solutions. One for computing the minimum
of the array and one for the maximum. Four participants
identified both options. One chose a wrong solution. One
participant got one answer correct and rated several others
equally likely, including the correct one. Programmers
required 20 minutes or less for both tasks.
Experiment 2: Overall participants could not significantly
narrow the search space. Often their intuition seemed not
helpful, eg. the (statement) options rated as ‘likely’ did not
contain any statements belonging to the confidential code.
We discuss identifying unlikely options first. All participants
could correctly identify unlikely options. However, they were
rather specific, ie. five or less pairs of unlikely options,
eg. similar to the example in Figure 1. Thus, none of the
participants managed to reduce the search space by more
than a factor of two. Identifying likely paths was even less
successful: One participant did not mention any likely paths,
one participant mentioned paths not sharing any common
option with the solution. One participant mentioned paths
with various options per statement but in fact only one of
they had only one single option in common with the solution.
One answer contained paths with two statements that were
also part of the solution. Another answer contained paths, out
of which only one had one statement in common with the
solution. Thus, none of the participants was able to identify
a set of paths that contained the solution.
In summary, the second task was significantly more difficult
and the participants were not successful at de-obfuscating.
Overall, we conclude that humans were not able to correctly
and efficiently narrow down the search space to a reasonable
number of program options. Although this might change given
more time and experience. We also want to emphasize that we
used only a toy example both with respect to the number of
options generated and also with respect to code length. Thus,
we believe that source code encryption is effective.
VII. RELATED WORK
There is a variety of approaches to avoid piracy, reverse en-
gineering, and tampering [21] such as license files, checksums
obfuscation, to name but a few. We only discuss obfuscation:
(De-)Obfuscation techniques: There is a rich literature on
source code obfuscation techniques, including general surveys
(e.g., [3]) as well as a more recent survey focusing on malware
obfuscation techniques [25] and a short discussion involving
(indistinguishability) obfuscation [6]. One common technique
is to introduce opaque predicates to insert dead code. The
idea is to have a control statement with two branches that
always executes one of the branches. However, it should not
be detectable by (static) analysis that the condition always
evaluates to the same value. Clearly, dynamic analysis might
yield some hints whether or not the code in one branch is
dead, but there are theoretical limitations (as the problem is
reducible to the halting problem) [5]. Since we encrypt the
condition and always execute both branches, it is impossible
that code analysis provides any information about which
branch is executed. In ordinary programs, adding fake or junk
statements must be done with care because the program must
remain correct. Thus, typically any change to the program
by a junk statement that modifies the final outcome has to
be undone, eg. by applying the inverse operation. However,
little is known on how to actually create junk statements to
disguise a human programmer. In the same work, obfuscation
through dead code, void code, code duplication are briefly
mentioned but with primary focus on avoiding detection by an
automated de-obfuscater (rather than by a reverse engineer).
An Intermediate Level Obfuscation Method [11] gives some
high level guidelines for obfuscation: The authors mention
that constants can be calculated automatically because they
might help to identify an algorithm. They also mention dead
code generation focusing on alias analysis. Furthermore, they
state briefly that dead code should be similar to the original
executable code but without giving further insights. There is
also work on adding junk to confuse a disassembler [18]. The
junk statements should be unreachable and partial statements.
Other than that, there is no discussion on what statements to
choose. We are not limited to add junk statements and their
inverses in our approach, since we can use selector variables
to control whether or not a junk statement influences program
state. Generally, the effectiveness of obfuscation techniques
is still subject to study [1], [9]. For example, one possible
attack against obfuscation is frequency analysis using, e.g.,
pattern mining algorithms. Pattern mining has been employed
for program comprehension [24] and reverse engineering [19].
We provide an empirical analysis of source code patterns for
similar problems across developers. These patterns could be
used to create obfuscated statements that are harder to identify.
Recent work has identified programmers using abstract syn-
tax trees with a surprisingly high success rate despite obfusca-
tion of code [7]. We do not attempt to identify programmers
based on code, but we use code of the same programmer
to support the reconstruction of obfuscated code. We use
only small parts of the abstract syntax tree and compute also
aggregate (i.e, pattern) statistics.
Obfuscation is also (ab)used by malware [22] to circumvent
intrusion detection systems by using polymorphic techniques.
Though obfuscation is typically associated with source or ma-
chine code, obfuscation techniques have also been applied to
data [2]. Obfuscation has also been leverage to to construct an
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abstract state machine that enables computation on encrypted
and non-encrypted data [20].
Metrics and goals: Metrics to assess code obfuscation have
been discussed in the literature as well [10], namely code
potency (related to code complexity measures), resilience
(against an automated de-obfuscator), stealth (easiness to spot
obfuscated code by reverse engineer) and (additional) execu-
tion cost. We maintain the underlying ideas of these metrics
and adjust them to our context. We also add a new metric
‘program class quality’. In this work, we mainly focus on
obfuscating functions. However, literature on obfuscation has
discussed other directions as well, e.g., false refactoring to
disguise class structure [3] or removing type information for
Byte-code [12].
Circuit Privacy: Traditional program obfuscation attempts dis-
guise the computation (of a circuit) in one way or another.
For instance, Indistinguishability obfuscation requires that
given any two equivalent circuits C0 and C1 of similar size,
the obfuscations of C0 and C1 should be computationally
indistinguishable [13]. In functional encryption [13], cipher-
texts encrypt inputs x, and keys are issued for circuits C.
Using a key to decrypt a ciphertext ENC(C(x)), yields the
result of the circuit C evaluated for x but does not reveal
anything else about x. Furthermore, no collusion of secret
key holders should be able to learn anything more than the
union of what they can each learn individually. Since the
introduction of these concepts [13], significant progress has
been made (see [16] for an overview). We argue that from a
practical perspective, encryption at the source (or byte) code
level is more meaningful than for Boolean circuits due to
performance reasons. Given a processor supports n commands
each implemented using circuits of size x log n, it suffices
to hide the command type rather than the circuit.
One cannot hope to obfuscate arbitrary programs [4] when
requiring that a circuit should leak no information except
its input and output behavior. Using a more relaxed notion
for obfuscation, an obfuscated program may leak as much
information as any other program with equivalent function-
ality [15]. However, this makes information theoretic obfus-
cation impossible (in polynomial time).
Keeping the circuit private while changing any wire value
in the circuit has also been investigated [17]. An attack can
be detected and data can then be erased.
In his thesis Gentry [14] gave a fully homomorphic encryp-
tion (FHE) scheme. He also discussed how to ensure circuit
privacy by adding a large random error vector.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
Computing on encrypted data is close to being practical,
e.g., using secure multi-party computation. In this paper, we
have looked at the next step after protecting data privacy:
Keeping algorithms confidential at the source code or bytecode
level. We have shown that by adding misleading statements
a high degree of protection can be achieved with a modest
increase in computational complexity given that computation
is carried out on encrypted data. While our assessment showed
the effectiveness of our approach, this is just one of the first
steps and there are many interesting directions for future work
in this domain.
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